Marginal contribution, reciprocity and equity in segregated groups: Bounded rationality and self-organization in social networks

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 31, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 2085-2107

  Kirman, Alan ^a   Markose, Sheri ^b   Giansante, Simone ^b   Pin, Paolo ^c  

^a Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

^c CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Efficiency; Myerson Shapley value; Self organization; Social networks; Stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247552794     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2007.01.003     Document Type: Article

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