Residual income-based compensation plans for controlling investment decisions under sequential private information

Management Science

Volumn 53, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 495-507

  Pfeiffer, Thomas ^a   Schneider, Georg ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Accounting adjustments; Residual income; Sequential adverse selection problem; Sequential capital budgeting

Indexed keywords

BUDGET CONTROL; DECISION MAKING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; ROBUSTNESS (CONTROL SYSTEMS); WAGES;

ACCOUNTING ADJUSTMENTS; RESIDUAL INCOME; SEQUENTIAL ADVERSE SELECTION PROBLEMS; SEQUENTIAL CAPITAL BUDGETING;

INVESTMENTS;

EID: 34247534120     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0631     Document Type: Article

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