Incentives for sabotage in vertically related industries

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 235-260

  Mandy, David M ^a   Sappington, David E M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Regulation; Sabotage; Vertically integrated industries

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247346882     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-9015-7     Document Type: Article

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