Mixing tools against proliferation: The EU's strategy for dealing with weapons of mass destruction

European Foreign Affairs Review

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 417-438

  Álvarez Verdugo, Milagros ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BARCELONA   (Spain)

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EID: 34247276962     PISSN: 13846299     EISSN: 18758223     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.54648/eerr2006033     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Among the EU's earliest measures were actions in favour of the inclusion of a legally binding protocol to reinforce the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the EU acquis with regards to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). At the beginning of the 1980's, EU Member States began to address jointly the problems of nuclear proliferation through an informal working group within the framework of European Political Cooperation. Through the Single Europe Act, another working group was formed on chemical and biological weapons. The activity of these working groups, since the adoption of the European Union treaty, has been carried out within the Committee on Non-Proliferation (CONOP) which addresses the questions of WMD and missile proliferation from the perspective of the CFSP. See Burkard Schmitt (ed.), 'EU cooperative threat reduction activities in Russia' (2003) Chaillot Paper 61, pp. 9-15
2. Clara Portela, 'The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Way to Thessaloniki and Beyond' (2003) PRIF Reports No. 65, pp. 2-22
3. and Eileen Denza, 'Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The European Union and Iran' (2005) 10 EFA Rev, pp. 289-311.
4. In similar sense, see Gerrard Quille and Stephen Pullinger, 'The European Union: Tackling the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction', ISIS Report, November 2003, available at , accessed 1 July 2005; and Portela, note 1 above, pp. 3-5.
5. EU Strategy, paragraph 8. Several studies on the security threats in Europe nowadays identified, also, this specific connection between non-state actors and biological and chemical attacks. See E. Kirchner and J. Sperling, 'The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence' (2002) 7 EFA Rev, p. 435.
6. Most US analysts perceive the nuclear terrorist risk as more likely than European analysts usually do. For European representatives of this trend, see Harald Müller, 'Terrorism, proliferation: A European threat assessment' (2003) Chaillot Paper No. 58
7. Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt (eds), 'Fighting proliferation: European Perspectives' (2003) Chaillot Paper No. 66
8. and previously, Karl-Heinz Kamp, 'Nuclear Terrorism is Not the Core Problem' in 'WMD Terrorism: An Exchange' Survival (Winter 1998-1999), pp. 168-171
9. For US representatives, see Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Harvard University Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, Washington D.C., May 2004), available at , accessed 4 July 2005
10. and Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (Times Books, New York, 2004), pp. 19-120.
11. Most of European observers think a direct attack with WMD on European soil is unlikely. See Gustav Lindstrom, 'Protecting the European Homeland: The CBR Dimension' (2004) Chaillot Paper No. 69: and Müller, note 8 above.
12. On this matter, see Milagros Alvarez, La política de seguridad y defensa de la Unión Europea (Dykinson, Madrid, 2003).
13. The literature from the Western European Union (WEU) Assembly expresses concern about the risks involving the possibility of terrorist attacks using WMD, but it also draws attention to the existing technical difficulties that make it unlikely these attacks would have a massive impact on the population. See 'Chemical, Biological and Radiological Terrorism', report submitted on behalf of the Defense Committee by Mr Le Guen, Assembly of the WEU, document A/1858, 3 June 2004.
14. Comparing the European Security Strategy and the US National Security Strategy, Duke mentions how some of their concrete differences May 'signify some more profound transatlantic differences, with the EU more inclined to see a variety of (loosely termed) security challenges, while the USA is more inclined to see more specific challenges based on recent history'. See Simon Duke, 'The European Security Strategy in a Comparative Framework: Does it Make for Secure Alliances in a Better World?' (2004) 9 EFA Rev, pp. 459-481 at p. 463.
15. Diagnosis and goals are set up in the initial paragraphs of the US Strategy. See National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, Introduction. The Bush administration strategy thus has changed the focus from 'what' to 'who'. See Joseph Cirincione 'A New Non-Proliferation Strategy', paper submitted for the Conference on Transatlantic Security and Nuclear Proliferation, Rome, Italy, 10-11 June 2005, available at , accessed 1 July 2005.
16. As Richard Whitman states when analyzing the conception of power in the European Security Strategy. See Richard Whitman, 'Road Map for a Route March? (De-)civilianizing through the EU's Security Strategy' (2006) 11 EFA Rev, pp. 1-15 at p. 8.
17. See Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2003)
18. and Asle Toje 'The 2003 European Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal' (2005) 10 EFA Rev, pp. 117-133.
19. See Jessica Tuchman, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction and the United Nations' (2004) 10 Global Governance, pp. 265-271.
20. See Allison, note 8 above, pp. 171-175; and Sammy Salama, 'Was Libyan WMD Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?', Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), September 2004, available at , accessed 15 June 2005.
21. See Council Common Position 2005/329/PESC of 25 April 2005 relating to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, OJ 2005, L 106/32.
22. See Fundamental elements proposed by the European Union, in conformity with the common position adopted by the European Union Council of Ministers, to be inserted in the final document of the 2005 NPT Conference concerning Main Committee I (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/WP.1), Main Committee II (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.II/WP.1) and Main Committee III (NPT/CONF.2005/MC.III/WP.1), available at , accessed 7 July 2005. Concerning the role that the EU should and could play during the Conference, see Burkard Schmitt (ed.), 'Effective Non-proliferation: The European Union and the 2005 NPT Review Conference' (2005) Chaillot Paper No. 77.
23. Within the context of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, some analysts pointed out the different approach among EU Member States over the role of verification in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). While Austria and Italy called for FMCT negotiations to begin and emphasized the need to include verification provisions, the EU called for negotiations without preconditions, a statement that for some analysts mean that the negotiation of an FMCT should not be dependent upon the inclusion of a verification mechanism. See Peter Crail and James McMonigle, 'Stalemate in the Diplomatic Trenches: An Overview of the Diverging Positions at the 2005 NPT Review Conference', Center for Nonproliferation Studies, available at , accessed 1 July 2005.
24. The Strategy calls for coordinating EU policies within the framework of existing regimes; supporting the compliance of new Member States with these regimes; promoting the Commission's participation; and stimulating when necessary the introduction of catch-all clauses in exports control regimes. See B. Schmitt, 'A Common European Export Policy for Defense and Dual-use Items?' (2001) ISS-European Union Occasional Papers No. 25, p. 9.
25. Two of these measures must be emphasized. First, the creation of a center for diseases control. See Regulation (EC) No. 851/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 establishing a European centre for disease prevention and control (OJ 2004, L 142/1). Second, a proposal encouraged by the EU and its Member States during the BTWC annual experts meeting to elaborate guidelines on how to boost efficient national legislations as well as compliance with the BTWC dispositions - the EU stance was actually contrary to the US one. See Jonathan B. Tucker, 'The BWC New Process: A Preliminary Assessment' (Spring 2004) The Nonproliferation Review, pp. 32-33.
26. See Council of the European Union, Non-Proliferation Support of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Brussels, 1 June 2004, document 10052/04 (Presse 189). The Declaration confirms the connection between the PSI and the UN Security Council resolution 1540, 28 April 2004.
27. See House of Lords, European Union Committee, Preventing Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The EU Contribution, 13th Report of Session 2004-2005, 5 April 2005, paragraphs 56, 57, 70-72.
28. See Council of the EU, Brussels, 21 June 2006 (Doc. 10783/06, Press 189), EU-US Summit: Vienna, 21 June 2006 (Vienna Summit Declaration and Summit Progress Report on Political and Security Issues), p. 8 and 19.
29. See Council of the EU, Brussels, 11 May 2005 (Doc. 8799/05 ADD 1, Press 110), 15th EU-Russia Summit: Moscow, 10 May 2005 (Road Maps), pp. 32 and 36.
30. See Mohamed ElBaradei, 'Rethinking Nuclear Safeguards', Washington Post, 14 June 2006.