"In another time-zone, the bombs fall unsafety....": Targets, Civilians, and late modern war

Arab World Geographer

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 88-111

  Gregory, Derek ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY; WAR;

EID: 34247273072     PISSN: 14806800     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (139)

1. Christopher Coker, Yhe Future of War: The Re-enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). The most succinct statement of this ideology is the extraordinary remark attributed to Donald Rumsfeld when he was U.S. Secretary of Defense: "Death has a tendency to encourage a depressing view of war."
2. Blake Morrison, "Stop," in Lebanon, Lebanon, ed. Anna Wilson (London: SAQI, 2006), 27.
3. For the political contours of late modern war, see Vivienne Jabri, "War, Security and the Liberal State," Security Dialogue 37 (2006): 47-64. Jabri asks, "How, then, do we begin to conceptualize war in conditions where distinctions disappear, where war is conceived ... in terms of peace and security, so that the political is somehow banished in the name of governmentalizing practices whose purview knows no bounds, whose remit is precisely the banishment of limits, of boundaries and distinctions[?]" Her answer will be familiar to readers of Foucault (and Agamben): even as these boundaries are dissolved and distinctions rendered indistinct, so quite other boundaries and distinctions - exclusions -are installed and, as I seek to show here, literally put in place.
4. Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1978), 1.
5. Ibid., 103, 41.
6. Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993), 7.
7. Nick Cullaher, "Bombing at the Speed of Thought: Intelligence in the Coming Age of Cyberwar," Intelligence and National Security 18 (2003):141-54, 141.
8. Michael Haldrup, Lasse Koefoed, and Kirsten Simonsen, "Practical Orientalism: Bodies, Everyday Life and the Construction of Otherness; " Geografiska Annaler 88B (2006): 173-84.
9. Sven Lindqvist, A History of Bombing (New York: New Press, 2001).
10. See Mitchell Dean, "A Political Mythology of World Order: Carl Schmitt's Nomos," Theory, Culture and Society 23, 5 (2006):1-22.
11. See, e.g., Michael Paris, "Air Power in imperial Defence, 1880-1918," Journal of Contemporary History 24 (1989): 209-25;
12. for their continuing associations after World War I, see Paul Saint-Amour, "Air War Prophecy and Interwar Modernism," Comparative Literature Studies 42 (2005):130-61.
13. Philip Meilinger, "Trenchard and 'Morale Bombing': The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II," Journal of Military History 60 (1996):243-70.
14. Spain, France, and Italy were also actively engaged in bombing colonial populations: Spain in Morocco, France in Morocco and Syria, and Italy in Ethiopia.
15. Meilinger 1996:259
16. Priya Satia, "The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia," American Historical Review 111 (2006): 16-51;
17. David Killingray, "'A Swift Agent of Government': Air Power in British Colonial Africa, 1916-1939," Journal of African History 25 (1984):429-44, 432.
18. Churchill Papers 16/16, 12 May 1919. On 6 February 1922, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States signed a treaty recognizing that the use of gas in warfare had been "widely condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world" and agreeing to renounce its use "as between themselves," which is to say that "it would not be considered as binding upon one of them in a war with a non-adhering Power" or, by extension, with "uncivilized tribes." James Garner, "Proposed Rules for the Regulation of Aerial Warfare," American Journal of International Law 18 (1924): 56-81, 58-59.
19. Lindqvist, History of Bombing, 48;
20. Toby Dodge, "The Imposition of Order: Social Perception and the 'despotic' Power of Airplanes," in Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied, by Toby Dodge (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 131-56, 156.
21. See also David Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939 (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1990). Britain's final and most protracted application of the doctrine was in the Aden Protectorate from 1928 to 1966 (sic).
22. Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), 27.
23. Giulio Douhet, Il domino dell'aria, trans. as The Command of the Air (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942), qtd. in Saint-Amour, "Air War Prophecy," 137. That this was a Euro-American anxiety bears emphasis. In 1932, the British High Commissioner in Iraq was still insisting that "the term 'civilian population' has a very different meaning in Iraq from what it has in Europe," so that European sensibilities about civilian casualties there were literally misplaced: "The whole of its male population are potential fighters," he explained, "as the tribes are heavily armed." The same grotesque rationale was still in action 70 years later during the "war on terror."
24. Beau Grosscup, Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment (London and New York: Zed Books, 2006), 27.
25. César Vidal, La destrucción de Guernica (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1997). For the (brief) deliberations of von Richthofen's Target Selection Committee that identified Guernica as a potential defensive position for Republican forces, and his own discussion with the Spanish chief of staff, General Vigón, on the need to "further destroy enemy morale and quickly,"
26. see Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan Witts, Guernica: The Crucible of World War I (New York: Stein and Day, 1975), 105-7, 121.
27. Russell Martin, Picasso's War (New York: Penguin, 2003), 1.
28. One story has the poet Juan Larrea suggesting the subject of Guernica to Picasso, and Picasso replying that he had no idea what a bombed town looked like, to which Larrea is supposed to have said, "Like a bull in a china shop, run amok": Gijs van Hensbergen, Guernica: The Biography of a Twentieth-Century Icon (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), 32-33. This is rather too convenient but Picasso's painting - in which the bull and the corrida loom large - was, of course, not a realist work but a haunting and complex metaphor of suffering and disintegration. Art historians have offered a dazzling range of readings,
29. but see in particular Werner Hofmann, "Picasso's 'Guernica' in Its Historical Context," Artibus et Historiae 4 (1983): 141-69;
30. Jutta Held, "How Do the Political Effects of Paintings Come About? The Case of Picasso's 'Guernica,'" Oxford Art Journal 11 (1988):33-39;
31. Herschel Chipp, Picasso's Guernica: History, Transformations, Meanings (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
32. On the multiple meanings of Guernica as a place, see Pauliina Raento and Cameron Watson, "Gernika, Guernica, Guernica? Contested meanings of a Basque place," Political Geography 19 (2000): 707-36.
33. W. G. Sebald, On the Natural History of Destruction (New York: Random House, 2003);
34. the title essay first appeared in German in 2001. Sebald's title was taken from an essay Solly Zuckerman was to have written but never did. Compare Jörg Friedrich, The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) (first published in German in 2002);
35. Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002);
36. A.C. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: Was the Allied Bombing of Civilians in World War II a Necessity or a Crime? (London: Bloomsbury, 2006);
37. for earlier studies see, in particular, Stephen Garrett, Ethics and Airpower in World War II. The British Bombing of German Cities (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
38. Robert Moeller, "On the History of Man-Made Destruction: Loss, Death, Memory and Germany in the Bombing War," History Workshop Journal 61 (2006):103-34, 109-10.
39. Kenneth Hewitt, "Place Annihilation: Area Bombing and the Fate of Urban Places," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 73 (1983):257-84;
40. Kenneth Hewitt, The Social Space of Terror: Towards a Civil Interpretation of Total War," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 5 (1987):445-74;
41. Kenneth Hewitt, "'When the Great Planes Came and Made Ashes of Our City': Towards an Oral Geography of the Disasters of War," Antipode 26 (1994):1-34.
42. See Trevor Barnes and Matthew Farish, "Between Regions: Science, Militarism and American Geography from World War to Cold War," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 96 (2006):807-26.
43. Samuel Weber, Targets of Opportunity: On the Militarization of Thinking (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 18.
44. Seymour Hersh, "Up in the Air," New Yorker, 5 December 2005;
45. compare Cullaher, "Bombing at the Speed of Thought," on the instantaneous integration of the battle space into a single master narrative by a multi-service C4ISR backbone. It is in the spirit of the Stone Age that I recall U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's proposal just one day after 9/11: "There are no decent targets for bombing in Afghanistan, and we should consider bombing Iraq [because] it has better targets." The tempo of air attacks in Iraq has not slackened as war bleeds into occupation and occupation bleeds back into war: see Nick Turse, "Bombs over Baghdad: The Pentagon's Secret Air War in Iraq," http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=163152.
46. "Powerless in Gaza" (Report from IRIN, UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs), 10 September 2006, http:// electron-icintifada.net/v2/article5716.shtml.
47. B'Tselem, Act of Vengeance: Israel's Bombing of the Gaza Power Plant and Its Effects (September 2006). The report's authors note that "aiming attacks at civilian objects is forbidden under International Humanitarian Law and is considered a war crime" and conclude that "the power plant bombed by Israel is a purely civilian object and bombing it did nothing to impede the ability of Palestinian organizations to fire rockets into Israeli territory."
48. Rey Chow, "The Age of the World Target: Atom Bombs, Alterity, Area Studies," in The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory and Comparative Work by Rey Chow (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006),25-43, 36.
49. Caren Kaplan, "Mobility and War: The Cosmic View of US 'airpower,'" Evironment and Planning A 38 (2006):395-407;
50. Michael Hirsh, "Stuck in the Hot Zone," Newsweek, 1 May 2006.
51. On vertical geopolitics, see Stephen Graham, "Vertical Geopolitics: Baghdad and After," Antipode 36 (2004): 12-23.
52. Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 54;
53. Zygmunt Bauman, "Wars of the Globalization Era:" European Journal of Social Theory 4 (2001):11-28, 27;
54. compare Tom Engelhardt, "Degrading Behavior: The Middle East and the Barbarism of War from the Air," 28 July 2006, http:// www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=106273.
55. Mary-Louise Pratt, "'Scratches on the Face of the Country,' or, What Mr Barrow Saw in the Land of the Bushmen:" Critical Inquiry 12 (1985):119-43.
56. Robert Kaplan, "Hunting the Taliban in Las Vegas:'Atlantic Monthly, September 2006.
57. James Der Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Complex (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), xvi;
58. see also James Der Derian, "Imaging Terror: Logos, Pathos, Ethos:" Third World Quarterly 26 (2005):23-37.
59. Gregory, "Colonial Present," 199-212;
60. Stephen Graham, "Cities and the 'War on Terror,"' International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30 (2006):255-76.
61. The concept of "'collateral damage" is not a recent American invention; it was devised by British military planners during World War II. "Civilian casualties had to be accepted as a by-product of attacks on physical plant used for war production or even related civilian production": Charles Maier, "Targeting the City: Debates and Silences about the Aerial Bombing of World War. II:" International Review of the Red Cross 87 (2005): 429-44, 432.
62. Samuel Weber, "The Media and the War," Surfaces 1 (1991), art. 13, http://www.pum.umontreal.ca/revues/surfaces/vol1/ weber.html;
63. cf. Lisa Parks, "Satellite Views of Srebrenica: Tele-visuality and the Politics of Witnessing," Social Identities 7 (2001):585-611.
64. This section elaborates Derek Gregory, "The Death of the Civilian; " Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 24 (2006): 633-38.
65. For a succinct review of the Grotian tradition, see Karma Nabulsi, The Traditions of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999);
66. see also Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
67. Geoffrey Best, War and Law since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
68. There are, of course, other geographies that connect civilians to military violence in the region. Eyal Weizman has shown, with exemplary clarity, how the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank involves, in substantial measure, a civilian as well as a military occupation in contravention of art. 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention ("The Occupying Power shall not ... transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies" and in defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 242: Eyal Weizman and Rafi Segal, eds., A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architecture (London: Verso, 2003);
69. Eyal Weizman, A Hollow Land (London: Verso, 2007).
70. Laura King, "Israel's Reservists Shift from Civilians to Soldiers in a Day," Los Angeles Times, 24 July 2006.
71. Helen Kinsella, "Gendering Grotius: Sex and Sex Difference in the Laws of War," Political Theory 34, 2 (2006):161-91, 182-83.
72. Wenona Giles and Jennifer Hyndman, "Gender and Conflict in a Global Context," in Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones, ed. Wenona Giles and Jennifer Hyndman, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 3-23, 5.
73. See Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004).
74. See also Colm McKeogh, Innocent Civilians: The Morality of Killing in War [Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002);
75. R. Charli Carpenter, Innocent Women and Children: Gender Norms and the Protection of Civilians (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing, 2006).
76. Stephen Graham, "Remember Fallujah: Demonising Place, Constructing Atrocity," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 23 (2005): 1-10;
77. Learning from Fallujah (Oxford: Oxford Research Group, 2005).
78. Kinsella, "Gendering Grotius," 185.
79. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 7-8.
80. This is, of course, Marx writing in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte. Said used it as his opening epigraph to Orientalism, and the colonizing force of its paternalism will surely be as clear to his readers as it was to him.
81. Anne Orford, "Localizing the Other: The Imaginative Geography of Humanitarian Intervention," in Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law, by Anne Orford, 82-125 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 82-125.
82. Christian Hoeller, "Interview with Achille Mbembe," Springerin Magazine, March 2002, http://www.springerin.at;
83. see also Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics:" Public Culture 15 (2003):11-40.
84. Seymour Hersh, "Watching Lebanon," New Yorker 21 August 2006.
85. Tanya Reinhart, "Burning Lebanon: Israel's New Middle East:" Counterpunch, 27 July 2006.
86. Yitzhak Laor, "You Are Terrorists, We Are Virtuous," London Review of Books, 17 August 2006.
87. See Elizabeth Dauphine and Cristina Masters, eds., The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006);
88. Julian Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity and the Defence of Logistical Societies (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 2006).
89. U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Press Release 174 (06), 17 July 2006.
90. Alan Dershowitz, "Arithmetic of Pain," Wall Street Journal, 19 July 2006.
91. Alan Dershowitz, "'Civilian Casualty'? It Depends," Los Angeles Times, 22 July 2006. For a devastating critique of the terminus of these reductions,
92. see Juan Cole, "Dershowitz and Grades of Human Beings," Informed Comment, 24 July 2006, http://www.juancole.com/2006/07/ dershowitz-and-grades-of-human-beings.html. For Dershowitzs wider views on Israel,
93. see Alan Dershowitz, The Case for Israel (New York: Wiley, 2003);
94. cf. Norman Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah: The Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).
95. Harry de Quetteville, "You're All Targets, Israel Tells Lebanese in South," Daily Telegraph, 28 July 2006;
96. Ghaith Abdul-Ahad et al., "They Found Them Huddled Together," The Guardian, 31 July 2006.
97. J. Marshall Beier, "Discriminating Tastes: 'Smart' Bombs, Non-combatants and Notions of Legitimacy in Warfare," Security Dialogue 34 (2003):411-25, 422-23;
98. see also Thomas Smith, "The New Laws of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural Violence;" International Studies Quarterly 46 (2002): 355-74, 362. I do not make these arguments to excuse Hisbollah.
99. Amnesty International concluded that "the scale of the rocket attacks on cities, towns and villages in northern Israel, the indiscriminate nature of the weapons used, together with official statements, specifically those of Hizbullah's leader, show that Hizbullah has committed serious violations of international humanitarian law": Under Fire: Hizbullah's Attacks on Northern Israel (AI Index No. MDE 02/025/2006), 14 September 2006.
100. Hisbollah had thousands of Katyusha missiles, originally developed for the Soviet Army in World War II; most of them were BM 21s, which are easily mounted on trucks, mobile, and inexpensive; they have a limited range (around 20 km) and little guidance capacity. Hisbollah also had hundreds of Iranian-supplied Fajr-3 missiles, which have a longer range (20-45 km), and some Fajr-5 missiles (75 km).
101. Declan Walsh, "Unexploded Cluster Bombs Prompt Fear and Fury in Returning Refugees," The Guardian, 21 August 2006;
102. Scott Peterson, "Israeli Shelling Left Carpet of Bomblets," Christian Science Monitor 24 August 2006;
103. Rory McCarthy, "Cluster Bombing of Lebanon 'immoral,' UN Official Tells Israel," The Guardian, 31 August 2006;
104. Ben Russell, "Pressure for Ban on Cluster Bombs as Israel Is Accused of Targeting Civilians," The Independent, 31 August 2006;
105. Patrick Cockburn, "Deadly Harvest: The Lebanese Fields Sown with Cluster Bombs," The Independent, 18 September 2006. During the war Israel fired over 1 800 (mainly American-made) cluster bombs containing more than 1.2 million bomblets. One Israeli rocket-unit commander described the action as "insane and monstrous: we covered entire towns in cluster bombs."
106. Meron Rappaport, "IDF Commander: We Fired More Than a Million Cluster Bombs in Lebanon," Ha'aretz, 12 September 2006;
107. see also "Israel Opted for Cheaper, Unsafe Cluster Bombs in Lebanon War," Ha'aretz, 14 November 2006. Here, too, the effects are dispersed and delayed: cluster bombs do not pinpoint but saturate, since each bomb disperses its bomblets over 20 000 m2, and 25 % (and perhaps as many as 30-40 %) of them fail to explode on impact, so that, as Landmine Action notes, "the rubble-filled villages of southern Lebanon have been deliberately turned into minefields that will indiscriminately kill civilians for years to come" (quoted in Ben Russell, Pressure for Ban).
108. Thomas Friedman, "Are There Any Iraqis in Iraq?" New York Times, 8 April 2004.
109. Described in Derek Gregory, War Cultures (New York: Routledge, forthcoming).
110. Israel's Deputy UN Ambassador defends Israel's attack on Lebanon, transcript of interview with Amy Goodman, 24 August 2006 at http:// www.democracynow.org/print.pl?sid=06/08/24/1425218)
111. Mona Harb and Reinoud Leenders, "Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception," Third World Quarterly 26 (2005):173-97.
112. Human Rights Watch, Fatal Strikes: Israel's Indiscriminate Attacks against Civilians in Lebanon (2006).
113. An orchestrated campaign to vilify Human Rights Watch followed (and preceded) this report: see Arveh Neier, "The Attack on Human Rights Watch," New York Review of Books, 2 November 2006. Human Rights Watch did not ignore Hisbollah's violations of international law, but its central - unassailable - point was that these crimes did not justify Israel's own indiscriminate attacks on civilians.
114. Amira Hass, "Nasrallah Didn't Mean To," Ha'aretz, 17 August 2006. Hass used the Hisbollah leader's claim that civilian casualties in northern Israel were unintended to argue that Israelis ought to have no difficulty in recognizing the casuistry because they used it all the time themselves.
115. Harry de Quetteville, "You're All Targets;" Ghaith Abdul-Ahad et al., "They Found Them Huddled Together," The Guardian, 31 July 2006. The same argument was repeated by Israel's Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies in December 2006: "The construction of a broad military infrastructure, positioned and hidden in populated areas, was intended to minimize Hisbollah's vulnerability. Hisbollah would also gain a propaganda advantage if it could represent Israel as attacking innocent civilians."
116. Mitch Prothero, "The 'Hiding Among Civilians' Myth," 28 July 2006, URL http://www.salon.com/news/feature/e006/07/28/hezbollah/ index_np.html;
117. Dahr Jamail, "No Hezbollah Rockets Fired from Qana," Inter Press Service, 1 August 2006. Human Rights Watch reached similar conclusions; its on-the-ground researchers found "no cases in which Hizbollah deliberately used civilians as shields" and reported detailed, credible, and consistent testimony from witnesses who affirmed that Hisbollah was not present in their homes or in the vicinity when IDF attacks took place: Human Rights Watch, Fatal Strikes, 3, 15.
118. Anthony Shadid, "Civilian Toll Mounts in Lebanon Conflict," Washington Post, 24 July 2006;
119. Nicholas Blanford and Ned Parker, "Fleeing Civilian Vehicles Hit by Israeli Missiles," The Times, 24 July 2006;
120. Sabrina Tavernise, "A Night of Terror and Death for Lebanese Villagers," New York Times, 31 July 2006;
121. Robert Fisk, "How Can We Stand By and Allow This to Go On?" The Independent, 31 July 2006;
122. Sabrina Tavernise, "Civilians Lose as Fighters Slip into the Fog of War," New York Times, 3 August 2006. Later, the chief of staff of the Israeli Air Force suggested that it might not have been responsible for the deaths at all and deliberately left dangling the suggestion that the building might have collapsed because the bombing triggered an explosion of weapons stored inside. Right-wing Web sites in the United States overflowed with bilious claims that the deaths were staged by Hezbollah: see, e.g., "Hezbollywood? Evidence Mounts that Qana Collapse and Deaths Were Staged," Israpundit.com, 31 July 2006, http://www.israpundit.com/2006/?p=2073,. Fox News repeated the same allegations, which were refuted by Associated Press, Reuters, and Agence-France Presse: David Bauder, "News Agencies Stand By Lebanon Photos," Associated Press, 1 August 2006.
123. See Human Rights Watch, Fatal Strikes.
124. "Israel's Deputy UN Ambassador Defends Israel's Attacks on Lebanon: 'We Cannot for Sure Prove That All of the Civilians in Southern Lebanon Were Purely Innocent,'" Democracy Now!, 24 August 2006, http:// www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/08/24/1425218.
125. Tavernise, "Civilians Lose."
126. Patrick McGreevy, "Criminalizing Civilians," Electronic Lebanon, 27 July 2006; compare Agamben, Homo Sacer.
127. James Strucke and David Fickley, "Israel Extends Lebanon Occupation Plan," The Guardian, 3 August 2006.
128. Amnesty International, Deliberate Destruction or "Collateral Damage"? Israeli Attacks on Civilian Infrastructure (AI Index: MDE 18/007/2006), 23 August 2006;
129. see the cumulative sequence of maps of Israeli attacks on Lebanon and its infrastructure at http://www.lebanonmaps.org. Compare this assault with the IDF's Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank, which I describe in Gregory, Colonial Present, ch. 6.
130. Anthony Shadid, "A Poor Beirut Neighborhood Feels Brunt of War," Washington Post, 15 July 2006.
131. Ananya Roy, "Civic Governmentality: The Politics of Inclusion in Beirut and Mumbai," Antipode, forthcoming; see also Mona Harb, "Urban Governance in Post-war Beirut: Resources, Negotiations and Contestations in the Elyssar Project," in Capital Cities: Ethnographies of Urban Governance in the Middle East, ed. S. Shiami, (Toronto: University of Toronto Pres, 2001), 111-33.
132. On Solidère, see Saree Makdisi, "Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidère," Critical Inquiry 23 (1997): 660-705;
133. C. Nagel, "Reconstructing Space, Re-creating Memory: Sectarian Politics and Urban Development in Post-war Beirut," Political Geography 21 (2002): 717-25;
134. Heiko Schmid, "Privatized Urbanity or a Politicized Society? Reconstruction in Beirut after the Civil War," European Planning Studies 14 (2006): 365-81.
135. Remarks by President Bush on Foreign Policy, 14 August 2006; US Department of State Press release at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/ 70549.htm)
136. Ramzi Kysia, 'The Distance from Guernica to Lebanon," Common Dreams, 17 July 2006, http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0717-23.htm;
137. John Berger, "After Guernica (1937) - Beirut, Qana, Tyre (2006)," in Lebanon, Lebanon, ed. Anna Wilson (London: SAQI, 2006), 109.
138. Lindqvist, History of Bombing, 74.
139. Van Hensbergen, Guernica, 24-25.