Product improvement and technological tying in a winner-take-all market

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 55, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 113-139

  Gilbert, Richard J ^a   Riordan, Michael H ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34147187144     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: 14676451     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2007.00305.x     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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