메뉴 건너뛰기
Social Choice and Welfare
Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 155-172
Parties with policy preferences and uncertainty over voter behavior
Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]
Indexed keywords

EID: 33947634009     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0120-4     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (2)
References (13)
  • 1
    • 0001837428 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Unequal societies: Income distribution and the social contract
    • Bénabou R (2000) Unequal societies: income distribution and the social contract. Am Econ Rev 90:96-129
    • (2000) Am Econ Rev , vol.90 , pp. 96-129
    • Bénabou, R.1
  • 2
    • 84936034419 scopus 로고
    • Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty, and convergence
    • Calvert RL (1985) Robustness of the multidimensional voting model: candidate motivations, uncertainty, and convergence. Am J Polit Sci 29:69-95
    • (1985) Am J Polit Sci , vol.29 , pp. 69-95
    • Calvert, R.L.1
  • 3
    • 0000053640 scopus 로고
    • Voting competitions with interested politicians: Platforms do not converge to the preferences of the median voter
    • Hansson I, Stuart C (1984) Voting competitions with interested politicians: platforms do not converge to the preferences of the median voter. Publ Choice 44:431-441
    • (1984) Publ Choice , vol.44 , pp. 431-441
    • Hansson, I.1    Stuart, C.2
  • 4
    • 0002860654 scopus 로고
    • Stability in competition
    • Hotelling H (1929) Stability in competition. Econ J 39:41-57
    • (1929) Econ J , vol.39 , pp. 41-57
    • Hotelling, H.1
  • 5
    • 38249001120 scopus 로고
    • A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy
    • Lindbeck A, Weibull JW (1993) A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy. J Publ Econ 51:195-209
    • (1993) J Publ Econ , vol.51 , pp. 195-209
    • Lindbeck, A.1    Weibull, J.W.2
  • 6
    • 0001419551 scopus 로고
    • Income tax progression, 1929-48
    • Musgrave RA, Thin T (1948) Income tax progression, 1929-48. J Polit Econ 56:498-514
    • (1948) J Polit Econ , vol.56 , pp. 498-514
    • Musgrave, R.A.1    Thin, T.2
  • 7
    • 0001387970 scopus 로고
    • A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics
    • Roemer JE (1994) A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics. Soc Choice Welfare 11:355-380
    • (1994) Soc Choice Welfare , vol.11 , pp. 355-380
    • Roemer, J.E.1
  • 8
    • 0031483391 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case
    • Roemer JE (1997) Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: the unidimensional case. Soc Choice Welfare 14:479-502
    • (1997) Soc Choice Welfare , vol.14 , pp. 479-502
    • Roemer, J.E.1
  • 9
    • 0032325207 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: An old argument in new garb
    • Roemer JE (1998) Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb. J Publ Econ 70:399-424
    • (1998) J Publ Econ , vol.70 , pp. 399-424
    • Roemer, J.E.1
  • 10
    • 0002715447 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The democratic political economy of progressive income taxation
    • Roemer JE (1999) The democratic political economy of progressive income taxation. Econometrica 67:1-19
    • (1999) Econometrica , vol.67 , pp. 1-19
    • Roemer, J.E.1
  • 12
    • 0001529276 scopus 로고
    • Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
    • Wittman D (1977) Candidates with policy preferences: a dynamic model. J Econ Theory 14: 180-189
    • (1977) J Econ Theory , vol.14 , pp. 180-189
    • Wittman, D.1
  • 13
    • 84974191786 scopus 로고
    • Candidate motivation: A synthesis of alternative theories
    • Wittman D (1983) Candidate motivation: a synthesis of alternative theories. Am Polit Sci Rev 77:142-157
    • (1983) Am Polit Sci Rev , vol.77 , pp. 142-157
    • Wittman, D.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.