'Constrained discretion' in UK monetary and regional policy

Regional Studies

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 267-280

  McVittie, Eric ^a   Swales, J Kim ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE   (United Kingdom)

^c Centre for Public Policy for Regions   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Delegation; Regional development agencies; Regional policy; Transactions cost politics

Indexed keywords

MONETARY POLICY; POLITICAL ECONOMY; REGENERATION; REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT; REGIONAL ECONOMY; REGIONAL POLICY; TRANSACTION COST;

ENGLAND; EURASIA; EUROPE; UNITED KINGDOM; WESTERN EUROPE;

EID: 33947366293     PISSN: 00343404     EISSN: 13600591     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00343400601056961     Document Type: Article

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