The convergence of disclosure and governance practices in the world's largest firms

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 294-310

  Markarian, Garen ^b,c   Parbonetti, Antonio ^a,d   Previts, Gary John ^e  

^a Dipartimento di Scienze Statistiche   (Italy)

^b Civil and Environmental Engineering   (Canada)

^c BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

^d UNIVERSITY OF PADOVA   (Italy)

^e CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Convergence; Corporate disclosure; Corporate governance; International accounting

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947195854     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00561.x     Document Type: Article

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