In favor of (plain) phenomenology

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 6, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 201-220

  Siewert, Charles ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Brentano; Heterophenomenology; Husserl; Neutrality; Phenomenology

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847624211     PISSN: 15687759     EISSN: 15728676     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-006-9035-x     Document Type: Review

References (28)

1. Blackmore, S. J., Brelstaff, G., Nelson, K., & Troscianko, T. (1995). Is the richness of our visual world an illusion? Transsaccadic memory for complex scenes. Perception, 24, 1075-1081.
2. Brentano, F. ([1874] 1972). Psychology from an empirical standpoint. London: Routledge (T. Rancurello, D. Terrell, & L. McAlister, Trans.).
3. Block, N. (2002). Concepts of consciousness. In D. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings. New York: Oxford University Press.
4. Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
5. Chalmers, D. (2003). The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief. In Q. Smith & A. Jokic (Eds.), Consciousness: New philosophical perspectives. Oxford University Press.
6. Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little Brown.
7. Dennett, D. (2005). Sweet dreams. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
8. Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
9. Husserl, E. ([1900/01] 2001). Logical investigations. London: Routledge (J. Findlay, Trans.).
10. Levine, J. (2001). Purple haze. New York: Oxford University Press.
11. Loar, B. (2002). Phenomenal states. In D. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings. New York: Oxford University Press.
12. Lycan, W. (1996). Consciousness and experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
13. Lycan, W. (2001). Have we neglected phenomenal consciousness? Psyche, 7(03), http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v7/psyche-7-03-lycan.html.
14. Lycan, W. (2004). The superiority of HOP to HOT. In R. Gennaro (Ed.), Higher-order theories of consciousness. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins.
15. Noë, A. (2002). Is visual experience a grand illusion? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(5-6), 1-12.
16. Noë, A., Pessoa, L., & Thompson, E. (2000). Beyond the grand illusion: What change blindness really teaches us about vision. Visual Cognition, 7(1/2/3), 93-106.
17. Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking about consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
18. Rensink, R. A. (2000). The dynamic representation of scenes. Visual Cognition, 7, 17.
19. Rosenthal, D. (2002). Explaining consciousness. In D. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings. New York: Oxford University Press.
20. Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
21. Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
22. Siewert, C. (1998). The significance of consciousness. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
23. Siewert, C. (2002). Is visual experience rich or poor? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(5-6), 131-140.
24. Thomasson, A. L. (2002). Phenomenology and the development of analytic philosophy. Southern Journal of Philosophy, XL(Supplement), 115-142.
25. Thomasson, A. (2005). First-person knowledge in phenomenology. In D. Smith & A. Thomasson (Eds.), Phenomenology and the philosophy of mind. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
26. Tye, M. (1995). Ten problems of consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
27. Tye. M. (2002). Consciousness, color and content. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
28. Zahavi, D. (1999). Self-awareness and alterity: A phenomenological investigation. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.