Have we neglected phenomenal consciousness?

Psyche

Volumn 7, Issue , 2001, Pages

  Lycan, William G ^a  

^a The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill   (United States)

Author keywords

"What it's like"; Consciousness; Experience; Introspection; Phenomenal character; Qualia

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042616619     PISSN: 1039723X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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