My beliefs about your beliefs: A case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic

Synthese

Volumn 155, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 191-209

  Van Ditmarsch, Hans ^a   Labuschagne, Willem ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Belief revision; Dynamic epistemic logic; Modal logic; Preferences

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847397081     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9144-7     Document Type: Article

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