Neoliberal economists and capital account liberalization in emerging markets

International Organization

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 443-463

  Chwieroth, Jeffrey ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33847361445     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818307070154     Document Type: Article

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