Democratic institutions versus autocratic regimes: The case of environmental policy

Public Choice

Volumn 130, Issue 3-4, 2007, Pages 381-393

  Fredriksson, Per G ^a   Wollscheid, Jim R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY KINGSVILLE   (United States)

Author keywords

Democracy; Environmental policy; Political institutions; Propensity score matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847335935     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9093-1     Document Type: Article

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