The empirical relationship between ownership characteristics and audit fees

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 257-285

  Mitra, Santanu ^a   Hossain, Mahmud ^b   Deis, Donald R ^c  

^a WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS   (United States)

^c TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY CORPUS CHRISTI   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency problem; Audit fees; Corporate Governance; Diffused institutional stock ownership; Institutional and noninstitutional blockholder ownership; Managerial stock ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847317577     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11156-006-0014-7     Document Type: Article

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