Explaining limited conflicts

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 65-82

  Kilgour, D Marc ^a   Zagare, Frank C ^b  

^a WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

Author keywords

Deterrence; Escalation; Limited conflict

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847165315     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: 15499219     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940601102852     Document Type: Article

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