Self-enforcing corruption: Information transmission and organizational response

The New Institutional Economics of Corruption

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 93-111

  Pechlivanos, Lambros ^a  

^a ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Greece)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33847125894     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203413920     Document Type: Chapter

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