Doxastic responsibility

Synthese

Volumn 155, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 127-155

  Levy, Neil ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846811192     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-005-3983-5     Document Type: Article

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