Horizontal mergers with free entry

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 157-172

  Davidson, Carl ^a,b   Mukherjee, Arijit ^b  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Free entry; Horizontal mergers

Indexed keywords

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

COST SYNERGIES; HORIZONTAL MERGERS; PRICE SETTING GAMES;

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS;

EID: 33846785218     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.03.003     Document Type: Article

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