Nagel's Atlas

Philosophy and Public Affairs

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 176-192

  Julius, A J ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644927251     PISSN: 00483915     EISSN: 10884963     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2006.00061.x     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Thomas Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2005): 113-47. Page numbers in the text refer to this article
2. Nagel refers to Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 240-80;
3. and to Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).
4. For a similar objection to Nagel's characterization of Beitz and Pogge, see Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, "Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?" Philosophy & Public Affairs, in this issue
5. Beitz, pp. 150-53;
6. Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 128-33.
7. Nagel, "Equality" in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 106-27;
8. Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 10-52.
9. f. John Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 580.
10. "...[J]ustice itself is a rise in exclusive obligation, but with a broader associative range and from a lower moral baseline..." (p. 132). Think of the levees left to sink because they were protecting no one important.
11. This argument was suggested by an Editor of Philosophy & Public Affairs.
12. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 25,
13. as cited by Nagel, "Problem," p. 122, n. 7.
14. When the difficulties of stabilizing the scope of protolegitimacy that I mentioned in Section II are kept in mind - it seemed that the obligations of term setters could be turned on or off depending on the moral description they gave to their own activity - it is remarkable that the trigger of these demands is not a moral relation at all. The trigger is your intention to get people to do things, and you cannot escape the obligation in which this involves you by retreating to a normatively disengaged understanding of what you are doing. Acceptability is required even where acceptance is not sought.
15. A. J. Julius, "Basic Structure and the Value of Equality," Philosophy & Public Affairs 31 (2003): 321-55.
16. Nagel, "Equality," p. 123.
17. In this restatement of Nagel's argument I draw on something Derek Parfit said in a seminar at NYU in 2002.
18. Moves to accelerate the flow of goods, capital, and labor across countries and the creation of international agencies charged with regulating it are projects for bringing new people into the range of old projects. Though I am not sure how to argue for the point, it seems especially important that these second-order projects, which take the scope of R as their explicit object, pay adequate attention to every one of the people whom they might bring into R.
19. i an index of i's goods, and α a parameter decaying from 1 to 0?
20. Abraham Lincoln, "First Inaugural Address" in Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 4, ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958), pp. 262-71.