Rational choice and regional governance

Journal of Urban Affairs

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 47-63

  Feiock, Richard C ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GOVERNANCE APPROACH; POLITICAL PROCESS; REGIONAL POLITICS;

EID: 33846664616     PISSN: 07352166     EISSN: 14679906     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9906.2007.00322.x     Document Type: Article

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