Cartel overcharges: Survey and meta-analysis

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 24, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 1109-1137

  Connor, John M ^a   Bolotova, Yuliya ^a  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust; Cartel; Collusion; Meta analysis; Overcharges

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; COST ACCOUNTING; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

CARTEL OVERCHARGES; META-ANALYSIS; OVERCHARGES;

REGRESSION ANALYSIS;

EID: 33846619409     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.04.003     Document Type: Article

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