Computing equilibria for a service provider game with (Im)perfect information

ACM Transactions on Algorithms

Volumn 2, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 679-706

  Beier, Rene ^a   Czumaj, Artur ^b,e   Krysta, Piotr ^c   Vöcking, Berthold ^d  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATICS   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^c TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^d RWTH AACHEN UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^e UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Imperfect information; Market equilibria; Service provider games

Indexed keywords

IMPERFECT INFORMATION; MARKET EQUILIBRIA; SERVICE PROVIDER GAMES; UTILITY FUNCTION;

ALGORITHMIC LANGUAGES; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COST EFFECTIVENESS; CUSTOMER SATISFACTION; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; ROBUSTNESS (CONTROL SYSTEMS); UTILITY PROGRAMS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 33846586942     PISSN: 15496325     EISSN: 15496333     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/1198513.1198524     Document Type: Conference Paper

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