Moral counseling

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 75, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 1317-1338

  Rhode, Deborah L ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33846580485     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (231)

1. Peter S. Cohan, Value Leadership: The 7 Principles that Drive Corporate Value in Any Economy 4 (2003).
2. Frank Newport, Military, Police Top Gallup's Annual Confidence in Institutions Poll, Gallup Poll Monthly, June 19, 2003, at 32, available at http://institution.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY= P0306033.
3. Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion Research, Survey by Los Angeles Times, Mar. 27-30, 2004, iPoll Databank, Apr. 1, 2004, www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ ipoll.html.
4. Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion Research & Peter D. Hart Research Assocs., iPoll Databank, Aug. 29,2002, www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html.
5. William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1453, 1453 (2006).
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. Ill 2003);
7. see also 17 C.F.R. 205 (2003). The legislation passed with a vote of 423-3.
8. See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Patton, Lawyers, Ethics and Enron, in Enron: Corporate Fiascos and Their Implications 625, 628 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
9. For bar opposition, see id. at 645; Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1236 (2003).
10. For the focus of the ABA Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, see Molly McDonough, Prove It: Task Force Seeks Evidence that Recent Policies Undermine Attorney-Client Privilege, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2005, at 60.
11. For California and Washington State Bar committees' challenges to the SEC regulations that implement Sarbanes-Oxley requirements, see Corps. Comm. of the Bus. Law Section and Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct, Cal. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Alert: The New SEC Attorney Conduct Rules v. California's Duty of Confidentiality (2004), available at http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/ SEC-ethics-alert.pdf; Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Background on the Proposed Interim Formal Ethics Opinion 1 (2003).
12. Model Rules of Prof 1 Conduct R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (2004) (noting that "[a]lthough a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied").
13. Id. R. 2.1.
14. Id. R. 2.1 cmt.
15. That view has dominated debates about the formulation and revision of bar ethical standards. For the role of such arguments in the initial drafts of the ABA Model Rules, see Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 620-21 (1985).
16. Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Firm, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 533 (1985).
17. Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers 6 (1988).
18. For the frequency with which this argument is made, see Deborah L. Rhode, Where Is the Leadership in Moral Leadership?, in Moral Leadership: The Theory and Practice of Power, Judgment, and Policy 1 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006).
19. For the value of preempting regulation, see Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1629, 1635-49 (2006).
20. Lynn Sharp Paine, Value Shift: Why Companies Must Merge Social and Financial Imperatives to Achieve Superior Performance 30 (2003);
21. see also David Vogel, The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility 6 (2005); Rhode, supra note 14, at 19-20.
22. See Paine, supra note 15, at 30-31;
23. Vogel, supra note 15, at 4;
24. Kimberly D. Rrawiec, Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery, 79 Or. L. Rev. 301, 310 (2000);
25. Rhode, supra note 14, at 19-20.
26. See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 256 (2d ed. 1994);
27. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).
28. For a representative list, see Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice (2000) [hereinafter, Rhode, Interests of Justice];
29. Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1185 (2003);
30. David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 Geo. L. Rev. 957 (1999)
31. [hereinafter Luban, Contrived Ignorance];
32. David Luban, Making Sense of Moral Meltdowns, in Moral Leadership: The Theory and Practice of Power, Judgment, and Policy, supra note 14, at 57
33. [hereinafter Luban, Making Sense];
34. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics in Counseling, 30 Pepp. L. Rev. 591, 602 (2003)
35. [hereinafter Rhode, Ethics in Counseling];
36. William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibilities for Collective Misconduct, 22 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (2005).
37. See infra notes 32, 59 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 18;
39. Koniak, supra note 6;
40. Luban, Contrived Ignorance, supra note 18;
41. Rhode & Patton, supra note 6;
42. Simon, supra note 18.
43. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics 515-37, 539-40, 708-27 (4th ed. 2004).
44. Philip C. Jessup, 1 Elihu Root 133 (1938).
45. Kathleen Hoffman Lambird & Traci Mann, When Do Ego Threats Lead to Self-Regulation Failure? Negative Consequences of Defensive High Self-Esteem, 32 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1179, 1179 (2006);
46. Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 968, 971 (2002).
47. See Max H. Bazerman, Judgment in Managerial Decision Making 37-39 (2002);
48. Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Optimism 100-12 (1990);
49. John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in Codes of Conduct: Behavioral Research into Business Ethics 13, 16-25 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996);
50. Langevoort, supra note 23, at 974;
51. David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of Decision Making, 37 Sloan Mgmt. Rev. 9 (1996);
52. Michael B. Metzger, Bridging the Gaps: Cognitive Constraints on Corporate Control & Ethics Education, 16 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 435, 475-78 (2005);
53. Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action, 16 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Performance 27 (1976).
54. See Krawiec, supra note 16, at 310;
55. sources cited supra note 24.
56. John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's Perspective, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 57, 93 (2005).
57. Id.
58. Scott Adams, Dilbert (Jan. 27, 2004) (on file with the author and the Fordham Law Review). I am indebted to David Luban for this cartoon, and for that matter, a great deal more that informs this essay.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. The classic account is Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 128-34 (1957). For more recent accounts, see Cognitive Dissonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory, in Social Psychology (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999);
63. Metzger, supra note 24, at 466-68, 478-79.
64. Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 983, 1033 (2005);
65. Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 Soc. Just. Res. 189, 197 (2004);
66. Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. Risk & Uncertainty 5 (2003).
67. Kim, supra note 33, at 1030-31;
68. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 Psychol. Bull. 480, 485 (1990);
69. Messick & Bazerman, supra note 24, at 10, 99-100;
70. Metzger, supra note 24, at 499.
71. John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational Corruption, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 1177, 1181-84 (2005);
72. Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 Am. Psychol. 697, 697-720 (2003).
73. Metzger, supra note 24, at 467.
74. For the classic account, see Elliot Aronson, The Social Animal 108 (1972).
75. Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 Soc. Just. Res. 223, 224 (2004).
76. Id. at 224-28, 230.
77. When asked to administer electric shocks to another participant in the experiment, about two-thirds of subjects fully complied up to levels marked dangerous, despite the victim's screams of pain. See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View 3-5 (1974).
78. Yet when the experiment was described to subjects, none believed that they would comply, and estimates of compliance by others were no more than one in a hundred. See id. at 27-31;
79. Arthur G. Miller, The Obedience Experiments: A Case Study of Controversy in Social Science 13, 21 (1986). For an overview of the Milgram work and its relevance for lawyers, see David Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in Ethics in Practice: Lawyers' Roles, Responsibilities, and Regulation 94, 96-97 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).
80. See Luban, Making Sense, supra note 18, at 73.
81. M.R. Banaji, Max H. Bazerman & D. Chugh, How (Un)Ethical Are You?, 81 Harv. Bus. Rev. 856, 864 (2003);
82. Messick & Bazerman, supra note 24, at 76.
83. John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration 147 (1989).
84. Dale T. Miller & Cathy McFarland, Pluralistic Ignorance: When Similarity Is Interpreted as Dissimilarity, 53 J. Personality and Soc. Psychol. 298, 298-305 (1987).
85. For applications in the corporate context, see Darley, supra note 35, at 1186-87.
86. Darley, supra note 35, at 1186-87.
87. Jackall, supra note 13, at 31;
88. Darley, supra note 35, at 1189-91;
89. Ronald R. Sims & Johannes Brinkmann, Enron Ethics (Or: Culture Matters More than Codes), 45 J. Bus. Ethics 243, 247 (2003).
90. Jackall, supra note 13, at 6;
91. Kim, supra note 33, at 1011, 1019.
92. J. Scott Armstrong, Social Irresponsibility in Management, 5 J. of Bus. Res. 185, 185 (1977).
93. In re Gutfreund, 51 S.E.C. 93, 98 (1992).
94. The result was a major financial crisis when the threat of a public investigation ultimately forced disclosure. The firm's share price plummeted, many clients withdrew their business, a government lawsuit imposed almost $300 million in penalties and the president and the CEO were forced to resign. See Paine, supra note 15, at 9-12.
95. Michael Lewis, Liar's Poker 164-67 (1989).
96. Id. at 167.
97. David Skeel, Icarus in the Boardroom: The Fundamental Flaws in Corporate America and Where They Came From 152-55 (2005);
98. Rhode, supra note 14, at 31-32.
99. Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (2003);
100. Sims & Brinkmann, supra note 45, at 250-51.
101. For a general overview of the Enron fall, see Kroger, supra note 26, at 69-84;
102. see also Langevoort, supra note 23, at 972.
103. For general discussion of the savings and loan crisis, see sources cited in Rhode & Luban, supra note 21, at 287-97,
104. and William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyers' Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 Law & Soc. Inquiry 243, 246-51 (1998).
105. For an account of the biases leading to lawyers' complicity, see Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 75 (1993).
106. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990).
107. See sources cited supra note 53.
108. David Luban, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., A Different Nightmare and a Different Dream, Paper Presentation at the Fordham University School of Law Symposium: The Internal Point of View in Law and Ethics (Feb. 10, 2006). For the reasons that other professionals fail as gatekeepers and the rationale for requiring lawyers to serve that function, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1293, 1305-07 (2003).
109. See Langevoort, supra note 53, at 95-105;
110. sources cited supra notes 24 and 32.
111. For a general review of social psychology literature as it relates to advocacy, see Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499 (1998);
112. Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior and Law, 81 Va. L. Rev. 853 (1995);
113. and David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 279 (2003).
114. For case histories, see Lon L. Fuller, Philosophy for the Practicing Lawyer, in Principles of Social Order 285-87 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981);
115. Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, "It's Hard to Be a Human Being and a Lawyer": Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W. Va. L. Rev. 495 (2003).
116. Kroger, supra note 26, at 97, 98;
117. Luban, Making Sense, supra note 18, at 70;
118. Messick & Darley, supra note 24, at 14-15;
119. Jeffrey Sonnenfeld & Paul R. Lawrence, Why Do C ompanies Succumb to Price Fixing?, in Ethics in Practice: Managing the Moral Corporation 184, 191 (Kenneth R. Andrews & Donald K. David eds., 1989).
120. Luban, Contrived Ignorance, supra note 18, at 976-80;
121. Simon, supra note 18, at 15-17;
122. Luban, supra note 56.
123. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 1201;
124. Luban, Contrived Ignorance, supra note 18, at 979;
125. Simon, supra note 18, at 17-20.
126. See Sims & Brinkmann, supra note 45, at 252-53.
127. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice 61-63, 122-28 (2004);
128. Rhode & Luban, supra note 21, at 309-10, 844-46.
129. Rhode, supra note 63, at 126-28.
130. The phrase comes from Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 Law & Soc'y Rev. 15, 28 (1967).
131. Rhode, supra note 63, at 106.
132. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7(a) (2004).
133. Id. R. 1.13 (2004).
134. Simon, supra note 5, at 1454.
135. Model Rule 1.13(b) provides that if the lawyers know of a possible legal violation that might be "imputed to the organization" and is "likely to result in substantial injury to the organization," they must proceed "as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization," which may include a report to its highest governing body. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires lawyers for organizations that issue public securities to report material legal violations up the chain of command.
136. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. Ill 2003);
137. see also 17 C.F.R. 205 (2003).
138. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13 cmt. 3.
139. For such conflicts of interest, see Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7, 1.8;
140. Rhode & Luban, supra note 21, at 562-68, 580-82.
141. Donald D. Landon, Country Lawyers: The Impact of Context on Professional Practice 136, 142 (1990);
142. Richard Abel, Revisioning Lawyers, in Lawyers in Society: An Overview 1, 6 (Richard Abel & Philip Lewis eds., 1995);
143. Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 Law & Soc'y Rev. 115, 136-41 (1979).
144. See Rhode, supra note 63, at 128.
145. See Rhode & Luban, supra note 21, at 646-48, 652-55.
146. Derek A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470, 504 (1976).
147. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 175.
148. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.4 (2004).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
150. The inadequacies of the legislation have been widely noted in Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 Vill. L. Rev. 725 (2004);
151. Developments in the Law-Corporations and Society, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2169, 2227, 2246 (2004)
152. [hereinafter Developments];
153. Kim, supra note 33, at 1048-52.
154. David A. Binder et al., Lawyers as Counselors: A Client Centered Approach 280, 282 (2d ed. 1991).
155. For similar views and a critique, see Rhode, Ethics in Counseling, supra note 18, at 604-14.
156. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, 53-58, 110-14;
157. Gordon, supra note 18, at 1204-07.
158. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 58-66 (1988);
159. see Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, 55-56;
160. Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market: The Evolving Role of Business Lawyers, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1105, 1127 (2005).
161. For the importance on counseling that extends to the purposes, not just the literal terms, of the law, see William H. Simon, Introduction: The Post-Enron Identity Crisis of the Business Lawyer, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 947, 953 (2005);
162. see also Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1988);
163. Gordon, supra note 18, at 1197-1207.
164. For the need for lawyers to present their own ethical views in the course of moral engagement with clients, see Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 225, 269 (2006).
165. For a discussion of the value of framing arguments in terms of their social legitimacy, see Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy and Economics: Legitimacy and Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1615 (2006).
166. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 67.
167. For a sample of the arguments, see Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 111;
168. Simon, supra note 18.
169. Simon, supra note 83, at 949.
170. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 111.
171. Id.
172. Kim, supra note 33, at 1016;
173. Miller, supra note 82, at 1123;
174. Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielson, Cops, Counsel, & Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 457, 466 (2000);
175. Robert Eli Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The Case of Enron, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1157, 1169 (2003).
176. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 30;
177. Miller, supra note 82, at 1117-18, 1121-26.
178. Miller, supra note 82, at 1121-26.
179. Kim, supra note 33, at 1005-07.
180. For equity interests, see Rhode & Luban, supra note 21, at 664.
181. Bazerman, supra note 24, at 3, 168-70;
182. Robert B. Cialdini. Influence: Science and Practice 90, 134, 196 (4th ed. 2004);
183. David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 279, 304-05 (2003);
184. Metzger, supra note 24, at 547-59;
185. Rhode, supra note 14, at 36-37, 47-50.
186. Luban, supra note 56.
187. Gordon, supra note 18, at 1211.
188. For variations on these questions and the evening news inquiry, see Paine, supra note 15, at 225-26;
189. Linda Klebe Treviño & Gary R. Weaver, Managing Ethics in Business Organizations: Social Scientific Perspectives 298 (2003).
190. For business lawyers questioning whether information requires disclosure, Simon proposes a test that asks whether a reasonable investor would be influenced by the information. Simon, supra note 5, at 1466 n.47;
191. Simon, supra note 18, at 7.
192. For critical reviews of legal advice in Enron, see Cramton, Cohen & Koniak, supra note 79;
193. Gordon, supra note 18;
194. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1139, 1162-80, 1186-1202 (2005);
195. Simon, supra note 18, at 5-11.
196. For a discussion of individuals' tendency to deny that self-serving biases apply to them, even when confronted by research, see Max H. Bazerman & George Loewenstein, Taking the Bias Out of Bean Counting, 2001 Harv. Bus. Rev. 28;
197. Kim, supra note 33, at 1029.
198. Rhode & Patton, supra note 6, at 635-36;
199. Simon, supra note 18, at 29.
200. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1(a)(2) (2005).
201. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B).
202. John Gibeaut, Telling Secrets, ABA J., Nov. 2004, at 73 (quoting Susan W. Ausman).
203. For the problems faced by whistleblowers and the inadequacy of current protections, see Rhode & Luban, supra note 21, at 403-09;
204. Kim, supra note 33, at 1064-65.
205. Kim, supra note 33, at 1055-63.
206. Rhode, supra note 63, at 142-43.
207. See Kim, supra note 33, at 1064-65;
208. Gibeaut, supra note 104, at 73;
209. Rhode & Luban, supra note 21, at 403-09.
210. One version of the noisy withdrawal rule appears at Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 71670, 71673 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 205).
211. For a discussion of opposition, see 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6329 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 205). A second version appears at 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6328 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 205).
212. The final rule does permit an attorney to make a noisy withdrawal to prevent the issuer from committing a material violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors. 17 C.F.R. 205.3(d)(2)(i) (2005). Many state confidentiality rules prohibit disclosure under such circumstances, and the issue of whether federal regulations preempt state ethical codes is now under dispute. See W. Bradley Wendel, Professional Responsibility: Examples and Explanations 79-82 (2004).
213. Coffee, supra note 56, at 1306-07;
214. Cramton, Cohen, & Koniak, supra note 79, at 816;
215. Developments, supra note 79, at 2246;
216. Miller, supra note 82, at 1129-30.
217. Rhode, supra note 63, at 131-37.
218. For gaps in research, see Rhode, supra note 14, at 51-53;
219. Trevino & Weaver, supra note 97, at 339.
220. For gaps in professional ethics education in law schools and business schools and strategies for improvement, see Metzger, supra note 24, at 438-49, 555-59;
221. supra note 14, at 47-51.
222. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 200
223. (quoting William Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. Legal Educ. 65, 66 (1991));
224. see also Vischer, supra note 84, at 271 (arguing for a fuller discussion of the moral implications of legal practice in law school).
225. Trevino & Weaver, supra note 97, at 339.
226. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
227. Lawrence J. Fox, The Fallout from Enron: Media Frenzy and Misguided Notions of Public Relations Are No Reason to Abandon Our Commitment to Our Clients, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1243, 1247.
228. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct pmbl. (2004).
229. For a sample, see Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 161-65,
230. and Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: A Comparative Perspective on Access to Legal Services and Accountability of the Legal Profession, 56 Current Legal 93 (2003).
231. Jean Renoir, Rules of the Game 53 (John McGrath & Maureen Teitelbaum trans., 1997).