Collusion and equilibrium selection in auctions

Economic Journal

Volumn 117, Issue 516, 2007, Pages 120-145

  Kwasnica, Anthony M ^a   Sherstyuk, Katerina ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS; MARKET CONDITIONS; PRICE DETERMINATION; PRICE DYNAMICS; SIGNALING;

EID: 33846351275     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02004.x     Document Type: Article

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