Costly signalling in auctions

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 74, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 173-206

  Hörner, Johannes ^a   Sahuguet, Nicolas ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

VALUATION;

EID: 33845971872     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00418.x     Document Type: Article

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