The environmental consequences of decentralizing the decision to decentralize

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 32-53

  Bowman Cutter, W ^a   DeShazo, J R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Decentralization; Devolution; Hazardous waste programs; Public goods; Regulation; Selection bias

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; DECISION MAKING; PUBLIC POLICY; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE; STANDARDS;

DECENTRALIZATION; DEVOLUTION; HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAMS; PUBLIC GOODS; SELECTION BIAS;

ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING;

DECENTRALIZATION; DEVOLUTION; ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION; GOVERNMENT RELATIONS; POLICY MAKING; STATE ROLE;

CALIFORNIA; NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 33845942271     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2006.02.007     Document Type: Article

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