The determinants of asset stripping: Theory and evidence from the transition economies

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 681-706

  Campos, Nauro F ^a   Giovannoni, Francesco ^b  

^a BRUNEL UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845750006     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/505370     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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