A positive theory of give-away privatization

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 22, Issue 8-9, 2004, Pages 1309-1325

  Debande, Olivier ^a   Friebel, Guido ^b,c  

^a EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK   (Luxembourg)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Property rights; Soft budget constraints; Transition

Indexed keywords

COSTS; INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; MANAGERS; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

INCENTIVES; PROPERTY RIGHTS; SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS; TRANSITION;

PRIVATIZATION;

EID: 9944248058     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.08.003     Document Type: Article

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