Capital budgeting, the hold-up problem, and information system design

Management Science

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 205-216

  Arya, Anil ^a   Féllingham, John ^a   Glover, Jonathan ^a   Sivaramakrishnan, K ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS; PROJECT MANAGEMENT;

CAPITAL BUDGETING; HOLD-UP PROBLEM;

BUDGET CONTROL;

EID: 0343090904     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.46.2.205.11927     Document Type: Article

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