Inequality and outside options in common-property resource use

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 83, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 214-239

  Tarui, Nori ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Common property resource; Cooperation; Credit; Dynamic game; Inequality

Indexed keywords

COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; RESOURCE USE;

EID: 33845528609     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.01.002     Document Type: Article

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