What motivates membership in non-renewable resource cartels? The case of OPEC

Resource and Energy Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 321-342

  Mason, Charles F ^a   Polasky, Stephen ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Cartel; Non renewable resources; OPEC

Indexed keywords

ENERGY UTILIZATION; MARKETING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PETROLEUM INDUSTRY; REGRESSION ANALYSIS;

CARTEL; NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCES;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; OPEC; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;

EID: 27944492400     PISSN: 09287655     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2005.04.003     Document Type: Article

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