The antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms

Organization Science

Volumn 17, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 724-740

  Bercovitz, Janet ^a   Jap, Sandy D ^b   Nickerson, Jack A ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

Exchange norms; Interorganizational relationship management; R D alliances

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845429990     PISSN: 10477039     EISSN: 15265455     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1060.0213     Document Type: Article

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