Computational explanation in neuroscience

Synthese

Volumn 153, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 343-353

  Piccinini, Gualtiero ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

Cognitive neuroscience; Computational explanation; Computational neuroscience; Computational theory of mind; Computationalism; Introspection; Mechanistic explanation; Models; Pancomputationalism; Representation; Theoretical neuroscience

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751527988     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9096-y     Document Type: Article

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