Information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching

European Economic Review

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 77-99

  Gehrig, Thomas ^a   Stenbacka, Rune ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

^b HANKEN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Finland)

Author keywords

Equilibrium switching; Information sharing; Lending relationships; Poaching

Indexed keywords

BANKING; COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); CREDIT PROVISION; ENTREPRENEUR; INFORMATION; POACHING;

EID: 33751400559     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2006.01.009     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. Acquisti A., and Varian H. Conditioning prices on purchase history. Marketing Science 24 (2005) 367-381
2. Ausubel, L., 1999. Adverse Selection in the Credit Market. Working Paper, University of Maryland.
3. Berger A., and Udell G. Relationship lending and lines of credit in small firm finance. Journal of Business 68 (1995) 351-382
4. Bouckaert, J., Degryse, H., 2001. Entry and strategic information display in credit markets. Working Paper, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
5. Bouckaert J., and Degryse H. Softening competition by inducing switching in credit markets. Journal of Industrial Economics 52 (2004) 27-52
6. Chen Y. Paying customers to switch. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 6 (1997) 877-897
7. Dell'Ariccia G., and Marquez R. Information and bank credit allocation, flight to quality of captivity: Information and credit allocation. Journal of Financial Economics 72 (2004) 185-214
8. Dell'Ariccia G., Friedman E., and Marquez R. Adverse selection as a barrier to entry in the banking industry. RAND Journal of Economics 30 (1999) 515-534
9. Dick A. Market structure and quality: An application to the banking industry. Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (2003), Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, IL
10. Dick, A., 2004. Competition in banking: exogenous or endogenous sunk costs? Federal Reserve Board Working Paper, Washington, DC.
11. Elsas R., and Krahnen J.P. Is relationship lending special? Evidence from credit-file data in Germany. Journal of Banking and Finance 22 (1998) 1283-1316
12. Farinha L., and Santos J. Switching from single to multiple bank lending relationships: Determinants and implications. Journal of Financial Intermediation 11 (2002) 124-151
13. Fischer, K.H., 2004. Acquisition of information in loan markets and bank market power-an empirical investigation. Working Paper, Department of Finance, University of Frankfurt.
14. Fudenberg D., and Tirole J. Customer Poaching and Brand Switching. RAND Journal of Economics 31 (2000) 634-657
15. Gal-Or E. Information Sharing in Oligopoly. Econometrica 53 (1985) 329-343
16. Gal-Or E. Information transmission-Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. Review of Economic Studies 53 (1986) 85-92
17. Gehrig T. Screening, cross-border banking, and the allocation of credit. Research in Economics 52 (1998) 387-407
18. Gehrig, T., Stenbacka, R., 2001. Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device? CEPR-Discussion Paper No. 2911, London.
19. Gehrig T., and Stenbacka R. Differentiation-induced switching costs and poaching. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 13 (2004) 635-655
20. Hauswald, R., Marquez, R., 2005. Competition and strategic information acquisition in credit markets. Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming.
21. Hoshi T., Kashyap A., and Scharfstein D. The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 27 (1990) 67-88
22. Hunt, R., 2005. A century of consumer credit reporting in America. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper 05-13, Philadelphia.
23. Japelli T., and Pagano M. Information sharing, lending and defaults: Cross-country evidence. Journal of Banking & Finance 26 (2002) 2017-2045
24. Kim M., Kliger D., and Vale B. Estimating switching costs and oligopolistic behavior. Journal of Financial Intermediation 12 (2003) 25-56
25. Negrin, J.L., 2001. Credit information sharing mechanisms in Mexico: Evaluation, perspectives, and effects on firms' access to bank credit. Working Paper No. 114, Center for Research in Economic Development and Public Policy at Stanford University.
26. Padilla J., and Pagano M. Endogenous communication among lenders and entrepreneurial incentives. Review of Financial Studies 10 (1997) 205-236
27. Padilla J., and Pagano M. Sharing default information as a borrower discipline device. European Economic Review 44 (2000) 1951-1980
28. Pagano M., and Japelli T. Information sharing in credit markets. Journal of Finance 43 (1993) 1693-1718
29. Petersen M., and Rajan R. The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from small business data. Journal of Finance 49 (1994) 3-37
30. Petersen M., and Rajan R. The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (1995) 407-443
31. Shapiro C. Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly. Review of Economic Studies 53 (1986) 433-446
32. Sharpe S. Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: A stylized model of customer relationships. Journal of Finance 45 (1990) 1069-1087
33. Shy O. The economics of network industries (2001), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom
34. Shy O. A quick-and-easy method for estimating switching costs. International Journal of Industrial Organization 20 (2002) 71-87
35. Stango V. Pricing with consumer switching costs: Evidence from the credit card market. Journal of Industrial Economics 50 (2002) 475-492
36. Taylor C. Supplier surfing: Competition and consumer behavior in subscription markets. RAND Journal of Economics 34 (2003) 223-246
37. Villas-Boas M. Dynamic competition with customer recognition. RAND Journal of Economics 30 (1999) 604-631
38. Villas-Boas M. Price cycles in markets with customer recognition. RAND Journal of Economics 35 (2004) 486-501
39. Von Thadden E.-L. Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: The winner's curse. Finance Research Letters 1 (2004) 11-23