Improving credibility by delegating judicial competence-the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 82, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 348-373

  Voigt, Stefan ^a,b   Ebeling, Michael ^a   Blume, Lorenz ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KASSEL   (Germany)

^b ICER   (Italy)

Author keywords

Credibility; Delegation of competence; Economic history; Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; Judicial independence

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC GROWTH; ECONOMIC HISTORY; INCOME; NATION STATE;

EID: 33751254121     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.04.004     Document Type: Article

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