Campaign finance reform and electoral competition

Public Choice

Volumn 129, Issue 3-4, 2006, Pages 263-300

  Lott Jr , John R ^a  

^a AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751101883     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9028-x     Document Type: Article

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