Term limits and electoral competitiveness: Evidence from California's state legislative races

Public Choice

Volumn 90, Issue 1-4, 1997, Pages 165-184

  Daniel, Kermit ^a   Lott Jr , John R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031526474     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5_7     Document Type: Article

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