The economics of political campaign finance: FECA and the puzzle of the not very greedy grandfathers

Public Choice

Volumn 93, Issue 3-4, 1997, Pages 245-270

  Milyo, Jeffrey ^a  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042135823     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1017972127133     Document Type: Article

References (32)

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