International cooperation and global environmental problems: Normative versus positive vision;Coopération internationale et problèmes environnementaux globaux: Vision normative versus vision positive

Revue d'Economie du Developpement

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 101-134

  Rotillon, Gilles ^a   Tazdaït, Tarik ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

^b CNRS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750539393     PISSN: 12454060     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3917/edd.171.0101     Document Type: Article

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