Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: Single-crossing and the CARA case

Economic Theory

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 151-169

  Jullien, Bruno ^a   Salanié, Bernard ^b,c   Salanié, François ^d  

^a Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

^b Howard Hughes Medical Institute   (United States)

^c CREST   (France)

^d UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Risk aversion; Screening

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750503190     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0040-z     Document Type: Article

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