Endogenous voting agendas

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 495-530

  Duggan, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750158137     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0143-x     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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