A time-consistent agreement in an interregional differential game on pollution and trade

International Game Theory Review

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 369-393

  Cabo, Francisco ^a,b   Escudero, Elena ^b   Martín Herrán, Guiomar ^b  

^a Dpto Economía Aplicada Matemáticas   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VALLADOLID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Cooperative and non cooperative games; Differential games; Dynamic individual rationality; Time consistent agreement; Trade and environment; Transboundary pollution

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749994235     PISSN: 02191989     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906000977     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Barrett, S. [1995] Trade restrictions in international environmental agreements, CSERGE Working Paper 1994-13, London Business School.
2. Bovenberg, A. L. and Smulders S. A. [1995] Environmental quality and pollution-augmenting technological change in a two-sectors endogenous growth model, Journal of Public Economics 57, 369-391.
3. Bovenberg, A. L. and Smulders S. A. [1996] Transitional impacts of environmental policy in an endogenous growth model, International Economic Review 37, 861-893.
4. Carraro, C. [1999] Environmental conflict, bargaining and cooperation, in V. D. Berg, (ed). Handbook of Environment and Resource Economics (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
5. Carraro, C. and Siniscalco, D. [1995] Policy coordination for sustainability: commitments, transfers and linked negotiations, in Goldin and Winters, (eds). The Economics of Sustainable Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
6. Carraro, C. and Siniscalco, D. [1997] R&D cooperation and the stability of international environmental agreements, in Carraro, (ed). International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
7. Dockner, E. J. and Van Long, N [1993] International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 25, 13-29.
8. Jørgensen, S. and Zaccour, G. [2001a] Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control, Automatica 37, 29-36.
9. Jørgensen, S. and Zaccour, G [2001b] Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 25(2) 1973-1987.
10. Jørgensen, S. and Zaccour, G [2002] Time consistency in cooperative differential games, in Zaccour (ed). Decision and Control in Management Science. Essays in Honor of Alain Haurie (Kluwer Academic Publishers).
11. Jørgensen, S., Martín-Herrán, G. and Zaccour, G. [2003] Agreeability and time-consistency in linear-state differential games, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 119(1).
12. Kaitala, V. and Pohjola, M [1995] Sustainable international agreements on greenhouse warming-A game theory study, in Carraro and Filar (eds.) Control and Game Theoretic Models of the Environment, Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, Vol. II. (Boston: Birkhäuser).
13. Katsoulacos, Y. [1997] R&D spillovers, R&D cooperation, innovation and international environmental agreements, in Carraro (ed.) International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
14. Mason, R. [1997] Dynamic pollution games, Nuffield College economics preprints, 129.
15. Moulin, H. [1988] Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
16. Musu, I. [1996] Transitional dynamics to optimal sustainable growth," Centre for Economic Policy Research. Discussion Paper 1282.
17. Petrosjan, L. A. and Zaccour, G. [2003] Time-Consistent Shapley Value Allocation of Pollution Cost Control, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27(3), 381-398.
18. Ploeg, F. V. D. [1987] Inefficiency of credible strategies in oligopolistic resource markets with uncertainty, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 11, 123-145.
19. Ploeg, F. V. D. and de. Zeeuw, A. J. [1992] International aspects of pollution control, Environmental and Resource Economics 2, 117-139.
20. Smulders, S. A. [1995] Environmental policy and sustainable economic, growth, De Economist 143, 163-195.