Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control

Automatica

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 29-36

  JØrgensen, Steffen ^a   Zaccour, Georges ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK   (Denmark)

^b GERAD   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPTIMAL CONTROL SYSTEMS;

DIFFERENTIAL GAMES; INCENTIVE EQUILIBRIUM;

AIR POLLUTION CONTROL;

EID: 0035216373     PISSN: 00051098     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0005-1098(00)00119-9     Document Type: Article

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