Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 381-398

  Petrosjan, Leon ^a   Zaccour, Georges ^b  

^a ST PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY   (Russian Federation)

^b HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Dynamic games; Dynamic programming; Environmental management; Shapley value; Time consistency

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037209632     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00053-7     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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