Legislative malapportionment and the politicization of Germany's intergovernmental transfer system

Public Finance Review

Volumn 34, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 637-662

  Pitlik, Hans ^a   Schneider, Friedrich ^b   Strotmann, Harald ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOHENHEIM   (Germany)

^b JOHANNES KEPLER UNIVERSITY LINZ   (Austria)

^c Institute for Applied Economic Research (IAW)   (Germany)

Author keywords

Fiscal transfer system; Germany; Legislative bargaining; Overrepresentation

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749831772     PISSN: 10911421     EISSN: 15527530     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1091142106289174     Document Type: Review

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