Delegating infrastructure projects with open access

Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

Volumn 88, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 243-261

  Mizuno, Keizo ^a   Shinkai, Tetsuya ^a  

^a KWANSEI GAKUIN UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Access charge; Coalition; Delegation; Network infrastructure

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748989852     PISSN: 09318658     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00712-006-0198-2     Document Type: Article

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