Credible implementation

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 18-36

  Chakravorty, Bhaskar ^a   Corchón, Luis C ^b   Wilkie, Simon ^c  

^a Monitor United States   (United States)

^b UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^c CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Commitment; Credibility; Implementation; Renegotiation

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748893238     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.001     Document Type: Article

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