Cognitive scientific challenges to morality

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 19, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 567-587

  Levy, Neil ^a  

^a Program on Ethics and the New Biosciences   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cognitive Science; Constructivism; Evolutionary Biology; Intuitions; Moral Theory; Neuroscience; Psychology

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748786228     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515080600901863     Document Type: Review

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