Owners or traders? Conceptualizations of institutional investors and their relationship with corporate managers

Human Relations

Volumn 59, Issue 8, 2006, Pages 1101-1132

  Hendry, John ^a,b,c   Sanderson, Paul ^d,e   Barker, Richard ^a,f   Roberts, John ^f,g  

^a Department of Management ^*  (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF READING   (United Kingdom)

^c GIRTON COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^d UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^e ANGLIA RUSKIN UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^f UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^g Organization Behaviour Group   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Accountability; Corporate governance; Institutional investors; Shareholder value

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748415844     PISSN: 00187267     EISSN: 1741282X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0018726706068793     Document Type: Review

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